August 8, 2022

United States Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230

RE: Notice and Request for Comment – “Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets”

To Whom It May Concern,

The Clearing House Association, L.L.C. (“TCH” or “The Clearing House”)\(^1\) appreciates efforts by the United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) to solicit stakeholder input on the implications of development and adoption of digital assets, and changes in financial market and payment infrastructures, for U.S. consumers, investors, and businesses and for equitable economic growth, and submits these comments in response to the various questions posed by Treasury in its request for comment.\(^2\) The Clearing House believes that for consumers and for U.S. firms, including banks, to realize the full potential of digital assets, a number of important issues relating to digital assets and the current digital assets ecosystem must be addressed.

In particular, The Clearing House believes that with respect to privately-issued digital assets (e.g., many stablecoins) and private token-based cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum):

- Banks, which are subject to comprehensive supervision and regulatory frameworks that help ensure their digital-asset-related activities are conducted safely and soundly and that consumers are protected, should be no less able to engage in digital-asset-related activities than nonbanks.
- Federal regulatory clarity is imperative, particularly where digital assets will serve as a means of payment or will be held in custody by financial institutions.
- A comprehensive federal prudential framework applying standards to digital asset service providers that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities is essential.
  - U.S. banks have a long history of successfully addressing the needs of the economy and accommodating changes in consumer preference, and stand ready to drive U.S. leadership in the digital asset marketplace.

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\(^1\) The Clearing House Association, L.L.C., the country’s oldest banking trade association, is a nonpartisan organization that provides informed advocacy and thought leadership on critical payments-related issues. Its sister company, The Clearing House Payments Company, L.L.C., owns and operates the core payments system infrastructure in the U.S., clearing and settling more than $2 trillion each day. See The Clearing House’s web page at [www.theclearinghouse.org](http://www.theclearinghouse.org).

And that with respect to a U.S. central bank digital currency (“CBDC”):

- The risks associated with the possible issuance of a CBDC in the U.S. outweigh its potential benefits.
- The policy goals that have been articulated in support of a CBDC would best be addressed through less risky, more efficient, and more economical alternatives that are either readily available in the market today or are under development through public and private initiatives.

I. Overview

The following overview identifies challenges and risks (A) posed by privately-issued digital assets (e.g., many stablecoins) and private token-based cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum); and (B) posed by a potential U.S. CBDC. The Clearing House believes that both present unique challenges and risks.

A. The Rapid Growth of Cryptocurrency and Stablecoins, and the Risks They Present

As a U.S. Senate policy committee recently observed, “[c]ryptocurrency has gone from obscure fad to a much more mainstream form of investment and finance.” In the past five years, the market capitalization for all cryptocurrencies increased from about $300 billion in June of 2018 to close to $3 trillion in late 2021. Although published reports and market trackers indicate that recent turmoil in digital asset markets has reduced the market capitalization of cryptocurrencies by as much as two-thirds, to around $1.1 trillion today, the rate of growth is remarkable. According to the International Monetary Fund, when “the market value of crypto assets surpassed $2 trillion [in] September 2021 [it represented] a ten-fold increase [from] early 2020”; and according to the November report on stablecoins issued by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (“PWG”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), as of October 2021, “[t]he market capitalization of stablecoins issued by the largest stablecoin issuers exceeded $127 billion” – a “nearly 500 percent increase over the preceding twelve months.”

Research conducted in connection with a House Financial Services Committee hearing on stablecoins held just months after the

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4 See CoinMarketCap, “Global Cryptocurrency Charts[,] Total Cryptocurrency Market Cap” (estimating the total market capitalization of the cryptocurrency market at $1.09T as of July 29, 2022); Todd Phillips and Alexandra Thornton, “Congress Must Not Provide Statutory Carveouts for Crypto Assets,” Center for American Progress (Mar. 1, 2022) (noting the collective crypto asset market capitalization peak of $2.9 trillion in Nov. 2021); and Speech by Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael J. Hsu to the Institute of International Economic Law (Apr. 8, 2022) (providing market size estimates and estimating the overall size of the cryptocurrency market at “around $2 trillion”).
PWG report was released found that “[a]s of February 3, 2022, stablecoins reached an estimated $174 billion in market capitalization.” While sometimes used to facilitate payment and transfer functions, much of the growth in cryptocurrency and stablecoins appears to come from investor speculation.

Private estimates show a similar, if not more rapid, rate of increase – suggesting as much as a 600 percent increase in the stablecoin market segment from 2020 to 2021. And the rate of growth is even faster when looking at specific cryptocurrency and stablecoins. Just two cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, represent a total market capitalization of more than $635 billion; and three stablecoins – Tether, USD Coin, and Binance USD – collectively represent more than $138 billion in market capitalization as of August 4.

Alarmingly, this growth has occurred in an ecosystem without comprehensive and consistent supervision and examination of cryptocurrency and stablecoin issuers and arrangements. As a result, specific stablecoins have collapsed, exposing users to losses, and matters routinely addressed in the supervision and examination processes of regulated financial institutions – matters such as capital and liquidity, reserve maintenance and management, operational risk, third party risk management, data security, data privacy, and anti-money-laundering and sanctions compliance – often go unaddressed, exposing the market and end-users to the resulting risks on an ongoing basis. These risks are not merely theoretical. For example, specific stablecoins arrangements have completely collapsed; issuers have abruptly decided to shut down operations/failed, and crypto-asset service providers have

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9 See Raphael Auer and David Tercero-Lucas, “Distrust or speculation? The socioeconomic drivers of US cryptocurrency investments,” Bank for International Settlements working paper No. 951 (July 2021), p. 30 (concluding that [c]ryptocurrencies are not sought as an alternative to fiat currencies or regulated finance, but instead are a niche digital speculation object); and Chris Matthews, “SEC’s Gensler warns Americans are diverting savings to ‘speculative crypto assets,’ says market needs investor protection,” MarketWatch (May 17, 2022).
11 See, e.g., CoinMarketCap, “Bitcoin,” at Market Cap (ALL) (showing a greater-than-2500% increase in market capitalization for Bitcoin from 2017 to 2022) (Jan. 31, 2022); CoinMarketCap, “Binance USD,” at Market Cap (1Y) (showing a 1000% increase in market capitalization for Binance USD in the past year) (Jan. 31, 2022); and “USD Coin,” at Market Cap (1Y) (showing a more-than-800% increase in market capitalization for USD Coin in the past year).
12 As of August 4, 2022. See CoinMarketCap.com, providing market capitalization figures, and major crypto-assets by percentage of total market capitalization.
13 Although some proponents of stablecoins suggest that state money transmitter licensing regimes are sufficient to address the risks presented by stablecoins, state money transmitter licensing regimes largely pre-date the development of stablecoins, are often not fit for purpose, and may not even cover stablecoin arrangements at all.
14 The G20, for example, has undertaken a study of the risks to the international monetary system presented by stablecoins. See G20, “Assessing the impact of stablecoins on the international monetary system: G20 and IMF to study the impact of Facebook’s Libra project,” G20 Insights (Dec. 10, 2020).
frozen accounts/cut off customers’ access to their digital assets;¹⁶ arrangements have suffered massive, sudden shocks due to internal and external manipulation and attack, including cyberattack;¹⁷ issuers have been found to have made material misrepresentations about backing/reserve status;¹⁸ arrangements have suffered from developmental difficulties and design challenges;¹⁹ misuse has presented significant anti-money laundering and terrorist financing (“AML/CFT”) concerns;²⁰ and run and contagion concerns have arisen. ²¹

¹⁶ See, e.g., Quiroz-Gutierrez, “Customers of bankrupt crypto lending service Voyager Digital are offered a way to access some of their frozen funds,” Fortune (July 22, 022); Ponnezhath & Wilson, “Major crypto lender Celsius files of bankruptcy,” Reuters (July 14, 2022); Vicky Ge Huang, “Big Crypto Lender Celsius Freezes All Account Withdrawals,” The Wall Street Journal (June 13, 2022); “Cryptocurrency project Basis to shut down and return funding to investors,” Reuters (Dec. 13, 2018) (noting that a project to launch a stablecoin called “Basis” was shutting down after soliciting over $133 million in investments); and Tomio Geron and Yuliya Chernova, “‘Stablecoin’ Project Basis Is Shutting Down After Raising $135 Million,” The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 13, 2018).

¹⁷ See Kharif, Shukla & Nicolle, “Hackers Steal $100 Million by Exploiting Crypto’s Weak Link,” Bloomberg (June 24, 2022); Cheyenne Ligon, “North Korean Hacking Group Behind $100M Horizon Bridge Hack: Report,” CoinDesk (June 30, 2022); Jonathan Ponciano, “Second Biggest Crypto Hack Ever: $600 Million in Ether Stolen From NFT Gaming Blockchain,” Forbes (Mar. 29, 2022); Emily Nicolle, “Crypto.com suspends withdrawals after ‘unauthorized activity,’” Los Angeles Times (Jan. 17, 2022) (noting that cryptocurrency and stablecoin wallet provider crypto.com stopped all deposits and withdrawals while investigating “unauthorized activity” and that Coinbase, Binance, and Kraken all experienced outages in 2021); Arjun Kharpal and Ryan Browne, “Hackers return nearly half of the $600 million they stole in one of the biggest crypto heists,” CNBC (Aug. 11, 2021) (noting that $33 million of Tether was part of a successful hacking of Poly Network, a platform that connects different blockchains together); and Yael Bizouati-Kennedy, “Stablecoin SafeDollar Crashes to $0 Following Cyberattack,” GOBankingRates.com (June 29, 2021). See also U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency Investments” (May 7, 2014) (noting the risk that crypto currency exchanges may stop operating or permanently shut down due to fraud, technical glitches, hackers or malware).


¹⁹ See Nivesh Rustgi, “Algorithmic Stablecoin Crashes 50% as Devs Scramble for a Fix,” Crypto Briefing (Apr. 7, 2021) (noting that the algorithmic stablecoin FEI suffered price instability due to a protocol mishap, forcing holders to choose between a reduced value holding (a “lower peg value”) and accepting a penalty of 50% for exchanging their FEI). See also Dr. Ryan Clements, “Built to Fail: The Inherent Fragility of Algorithmic Stablecoins,” 11 Wake Forest L. Rev. Online 113 (Oct. 25, 2021) (noting that algorithmic stablecoins have inherent design flaws that make them unstable); and Muyao Shen, “How $60 Billion in TerraCoins Went Up in Algorithmic Smoke,” Bloomberg (May 21, 2022) (detailing the extreme instability of the algorithmic stablecoin TerraUSD and its sister token Luna).

²⁰ See Timothy B. Lee, “Janet Yellen Will Consider Limiting the Use of Cryptocurrency,” WIRED (Jan. 22, 2021) (noting that Secretary Yellen has suggested the government should “examine ways in which [it] can curtail the[ ] use [of certain digital currencies] and make sure that [money laundering] doesn’t occur through those channels”); and Harry Robertson, “Janet Yellen says ‘misuse’ of cryptocurrencies like bitcoin is a growing problem, as regulators increase scrutiny after surge in interest,” Business Insider (Feb. 11, 2021) (quoting Janet Yellen as saying that “misuse” of cryptocurrencies is a “growing problem”).

²¹ See “The Next Stablecoin Collapse Could Be a Lot Worse,” supra note 15 (warning of potential run and contagion risks and their repercussions in financial markets); and Speech by Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael J. Hsu, supra note 4, p. 5 (making note of contagion risk as it relates to stablecoins).
The protection of digital asset users, including consumers and businesses, and the financial system from the risks associated with cryptocurrency and stablecoins is far too important to leave to a patchwork of state money transmitter laws that may or may not even apply depending on the vagaries of state statutes and individual state interpretations, and to developing state regulatory schemes. To address these risks, including the key stablecoin-related risks identified in the PWG’s “Report on STABLECOINS,” a comprehensive federal prudential framework applying standards that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities is essential. In addition, banks, which are subject to comprehensive supervision and regulatory frameworks that help ensure their digital-asset-related activities are conducted safely and soundly and that consumers are protected, require additional clarity from federal regulators to ensure continued, safe, sound, and responsible engagement in digital-asset-related activities.

22 State money transmitter licensing schemes, which largely pre-date the development of stablecoins, are often not fit for purpose, and may not even cover stablecoin arrangements at all. See Rinearson, Cohen & McLaughlin, “Trouble in Paradise: Florida Court Rules That Selling Bitcoin is Money Transmission,” K&L Gates U.S. FinTech Alert (Feb. 13, 2019) (noting that some states have “amended their money transmitter statutes to include or exclude virtual currencies explicitly”) (italics added for emphasis); California Department of Financial Protection & Innovation, “Re: ______-Opinion Request” letter (Oct. 4, 2019) (stating that the Department had not concluded whether cryptocurrency is money and falls under California’s banking or money transmission laws); and Pennsylvania Department of Banking, “Money Transmitter Act Guidance for Virtual Currency Businesses” (2017/2018) (posted by the department as of Dec. 29, 2021, and noting that because virtual currency is not “currency or legal tender” it is not covered by Pennsylvania’s Money Transmitter Act).

23 See, e.g., New York State Department of Financial Services, “Virtual Currency Guidance” (June 8, 2022) (constituting guidance to bit license holders and NY chartered limited purpose trust companies that issue U.S. dollar-backed stablecoins, and providing requirements that relate to (i) redeemability, (ii) assets backing stablecoin(s), and (iii) attestations about the backing assets).

24 Including: (i) market integrity risks; (ii) investor protection risks; (iii) illicit finance concerns/money laundering risks; and (iv) prudential risks related to stablecoins used for payments purposes, which can be further classified by: (1) loss of value: risks to users and stablecoin runs; (2) payment system risk; and (3) risks of scale: systemic risk and concentration of economic power. (See “Report on STABLECOINS,” supra note 7, pp. 1-3 & 15-17.)

25 Although federal financial regulators have given some attention to the digital-asset-related activities of banks, and generally recognized the importance of coordinated clarity on the topic, the agencies have not publicly adopted uniform views or supported an approach that would permit banks to engage in all digital-asset-related payments and financial activities that non-banks engage in, subject to fundamental safety and soundness requirements. In fact, prudential regulators have only addressed a handful of crypto- and digital-asset-related activities. See OCC Interpretive Letter #1170 (July 2020) (permitting banks to engage in cryptocurrency custody services); OCC Interpretive Letter #1172 (Oct. 2020) (permitting banks to hold stablecoin reserves); OCC Interpretive Letter # 1174 (Jan. 2021) (permitting banks to use independent node verification networks and stablecoins for payment activities); OCC Interpretive Letter # 1179 (Nov. 2021) (clarifying that the digital-asset-related activities addressed in letters 1170, 1172 and 1174 are legally permissible provided a bank can demonstrate to its supervisory office that it has controls in place to conduct the activity in a safe and sound manner); Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, “Joint Agency Statement [on crypto-asset policy sprint]” (Nov. 23, 2021) (recognizing the importance of federal banking agencies providing coordinated and timely clarity about crypto-assets and safety and soundness, consumer protection, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations, including anti-money laundering and illicit finance statutes and rules); “Report on STABLECOINS,” supra note 7; and FDIC FIL-16-2022 (Apr. 2022) (informing FDIC-supervised institutions of the need to notify the FDIC if currency engaged in, or of the intent to engage in, any activities involving or related to crypto or digital assets).
B. Central Bank Digital Currency

Recently, the U.S. government has shown an interest in the potential development of a U.S. CBDC. In January, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”) released its paper, “Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation,” as the “first step” in the consultative process the Fed is pursuing to explore whether a U.S. central bank digital currency (“CBDC”) would be beneficial. And in March the White House issued its Executive Order on “Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets,” dictating policy and actions on CBDC that includes analysis of the potential implications of a U.S. CBDC on a number of areas, continued research of CBDC, and an assessment of the legislative changes necessary for the U.S. to issue a CBDC.

After careful consideration, the Clearing House believes that the serious risks to the banking system that a CBDC would pose — risks that cannot be adequately controlled, regardless of proposed mitigants (e.g., intermediation, holding limits, etc.) — are not justified in light of the fact that every policy goal thus far articulated in support of a CBDC can be addressed through less risky, more efficient, and more economical alternatives that are either readily available in the market today, or are under development by the private sector (see Appendix A). Additionally, a U.S. CBDC is unlikely to be an effective tool for the purposes for which it has been advanced (e.g., financial inclusion and to preserve the status of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency). It is for these reasons that trade organizations representing every type of bank in the U.S., including small, minority, community depository institutions and credit unions, recently wrote to Congress in opposition to a CBDC, citing the lack of compelling use cases for a CBDC and the significant risks a U.S. CBDC poses.

The case for a U.S. CBDC is far from compelling when one considers: (1) the long history in the U.S. of privately-issued money (and the proven ability of regulatory frameworks to address issues associated with private money); (2) that the dollar is largely digital today and commercial bank money

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29 See also Letter from Robert C. Hunter, Director of Legislative & Regulatory Affairs and Deputy General Counsel, The Clearing House, to Ann E. Misbach, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 20, 2022) (link) (providing comments to the Fed in response to its consultative paper on CBDC).
successfully serves as a low-risk settlement asset;\(^{32}\) (3) that the status of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency has to do with a number of factors, such as respect for the rule of law, stable government, well-regulated and efficient markets, sound U.S. economic policies, etc.,\(^ {33}\) not the form it takes (commercial bank money is already in digital form);\(^ {34}\) and (4) that payment systems in the U.S. are diverse, highly competitive, and provide consumers and businesses with an extraordinary degree of choice at low cost.\(^ {35}\) It is even more difficult to make a case for the development of a U.S. CBDC when one factors in the significant private and public sector efforts that are already under way to improve cross-border payments, facilitate person-to-person payments, expand operating hours (the operating hours of CHIPS and Fedwire are not presently 24x7x365, but they could be), and reduce frictions in payments – all of which will continue irrespective of U.S. or foreign CBDC. In short, there is no obvious benefit from a U.S. CBDC.

Were a CBDC to nevertheless be introduced in the U.S., it would not likely impact the holding of privately-issued digital currency,\(^ {36}\) but would pose serious risks to the banking system and the economy that cannot be adequately controlled.\(^ {37}\) In particular, a CBDC would: (a) cannibalize bank deposits, as commercial bank money is converted into CBDC; (b) negatively impact lending and the cost of credit for consumers and businesses; (c) have a potentially destabilizing effect on foreign financial systems where individuals and businesses may prefer the relative safety and security of a U.S. central bank obligation to an obligation of their home central banks; (d) potentially expose the Fed to increased political pressures.

\(^{32}\) As of June 15, the Fed reported $2,527,237,000,000 Federal Reserve notes outstanding. (See Federal Reserve, “7. Collateral Held against Federal Reserve Notes: Federal Reserve Agents’ Accounts” (as of Jun. 15, 2022).) In comparison, the total assets of commercial banks in the U.S. amounted to $22,640,528,600,000. (See St. Louis Fed, “Total Assets, All Commercial Banks,” FRED Economic Data (as of Jun. 8, 2022).) Thus, much of what we think of today as money is commercial bank money that is digital in form.

\(^{33}\) See Carol Bertaut, Bastian von Beschwitz & Stephanie Curcuru, “The International Role of the U.S. Dollar,” FEDS Note (Oct. 6, 2021) (concluding, among other things, that while “[a] shifting payments landscape could [ ] pose a challenge to the U.S. dollar’s [international] dominance ... it is unlikely that technology alone [(including the introduction and growth of official digital currencies)] could alter the landscape enough to completely offset the long-standing reasons the dollar has been dominant.”)

\(^{34}\) See European Central Bank, “The international role of the euro, June 2021,” at Box 8 (running model simulations on the impact of a digital euro on the international role of the euro and concluding that a digital euro “would not necessarily be a game changer for the international role of the euro, which will continue to depend to a large extent on fundamental forces, such as stable economic fundamentals, size, and deep and liquid financial markets”).


\(^{36}\) There is no evidence that a CBDC would displace the availability or use of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins or impede their growth trajectory. Rather, there is evidence that $2 trillion worth of cryptocurrency is held for purposes other than transactional purposes, with approximately $180 billion in stablecoins supporting the larger cryptocurrency market by, for example, serving as a payment instrument. If true, and the vast majority of cryptocurrency is held for investment purposes, then such holding would not likely be affected by the introduction of a U.S. CBDC that did not pay interest. (See Speech by Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael J. Hsu, supra note 4, p. 2 (comparing the relationship between stablecoins and cryptocurrency to the relationship between the economy and total capital in the banking system, and observing that stablecoins are used to facilitate trading and lending involving cryptocurrency).)

over time, particularly if it is in a position of making interest rate changes to CBDC or determines holding limits; and (e) is likely to increase cyber and operational risk related to the money supply, but, at a minimum, concentrate risk in a way that does not occur today with paper currency. All of this is true regardless of whether a CBDC is “disintermediated” or “intermediated,” whether a CBDC pays interest, whether there are CBDC holding limits, or other approaches to risk mitigation are taken.

Under a “non-intermediated,” or “disintermediated,” model, the central bank would offer accounts directly to businesses and individuals. While not a new idea (direct relationships between consumers and the Fed have been proposed since the 1980s), offering CBDC directly to consumers and businesses would nonetheless radically alter the mission and structure of the Fed/federal government and constitute an unprecedented role for the government, generally, in the lives of U.S. citizens and the public at large. Under an “intermediated” model, the central bank would distribute CBDC through depository financial institutions, or possibly some other type of regulated entity/entities. While an intermediated model addresses some of the risks of CBDC by placing know-your-customer (“KYC”), anti-money-laundering (“AML”), and countering-the-financing-of-terrorism (“CFT”) screening and compliance obligations on the private sector, it is unclear that the private sector will want to take on the associated risks without a clear business case for doing so.

In terms of risk mitigants, a number of approaches have been proposed to limit the impact of a CBDC on the financial sector, with the Fed itself suggesting that reduction in the aggregate amount of deposits at banks could be ameliorated by the CBDC either not paying interest or being subject to holding limits. These mitigants are unlikely to be fully effective, or may result in downstream challenges for the Fed. For example, the non-payment of interest does not guarantee that cannibalization of commercial bank deposits will be adequately controlled. While a non-interest-bearing CBDC could be less attractive than a commercial bank deposit bearing interest, that would only hold true in high interest rate environments and in circumstances where the depositor was unconcerned about the risk of financial stability and capital preservation. In times of stress, depositors would undoubtedly choose the comparative safety of

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38 Letter from Robert C. Hunter, supra note 29, pp. 3-10.

39 Risk mitigants that have been proposed in order to limit the impact of a CBDC on the financial sector are unlikely to be fully effective, or may result in downstream challenges for the Fed. For example, neither an approach of not paying interest, or the imposition of holding limits, is likely to be an effective solution. (See, e.g., Bank of Canada, et al., “Central bank digital currencies: foundational principles and core features” (2020), pp. 8 & 12 (noting the importance of mitigating risks and means of designing CBDC instruments in ways that seek to manage risks); and Bank of Canada, et al., “Central bank digital currencies: financial stability implications” (Sept. 2021), pp. 5 &14 (proposing holding limits, transaction limits, and other safeguards to moderate CBDC usage and take-up).)


a CBDC over commercial bank money even though it was not interest-bearing.\textsuperscript{43} Essentially, a central bank liability carries with it guaranteed, immediate liquidity. A claim for deposit insurance does not, and is subject to insurance caps.\textsuperscript{44} As a further example, holding limits are also likely to be ineffective because calibrating holding limits will be difficult, if not impossible, and holding limits will, however they are set, frustrate certain purposes for which CBDC has been advanced. Illustrative of this tension, evidence suggests, on one hand, that holding limits would need to be extremely low to prevent significant harm to small and community banks;\textsuperscript{45} but, on the other hand, CBDC subject to holding limits likely cannot compete effectively with private sector cryptocurrencies to which no such holding limits apply, and cannot help preserve the role of the U.S. dollar in international trade and finance, as doing so would require large dollar transactions that would be impossible with holding limits.

Finally, historical lessons from direct competition between the federal government and the banking activities of the private sector demonstrate that unanticipated consequences can and do result. For example, lessons from the Postal Savings Program demonstrate that a government financial product designed to facilitate financial inclusion through offerings based on convenience and needs factors was susceptible to design alterations that intensified direct competition with the private sector. In the case of the Postal Savings Program, lagging demand for the savings product in areas where banking services were believed to be lacking or absent resulted in the government instituting higher-than-market interest rates to compete with the private sector.\textsuperscript{46} Although the Fed has suggested that non-payment of interest could be important to a CBDC not cannibalizing bank deposits,\textsuperscript{47} the inclusion of programmable features, such as features allowing for interest to be paid, may be irresistible for policymakers or politicians in the future. Even if a CBDC is designed with no features that can potentially be manipulated, because of the effect a CBDC is likely to have on deposits and lending, the Fed may be pressured to

\textsuperscript{43} See Fernandez-Villaverde, et al., “Central Bank Digital Currency: Central Banking for All?” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 20-19, p. 27 (June 2020) (noting that the stability of a central bank during a crisis could cause depositors to “internalize” the security feature and could “attract[ ] all deposits away from the commercial banking sector” as the central bank becomes a “deposit monopolist.”)

\textsuperscript{44} At present, the standard deposit insurance coverage limit is $250,000 per depositor, per FDIC-insured bank. (See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FAQs, “Can I have more than $250,000 of deposit insurance coverage at one FDIC-insured bank?” (Dec. 8, 2021).)

\textsuperscript{45} Statistical data on the size of bank deposits shows that the median value of transactional accounts in 2019 was quite low - $5,300; and at least one community banker has publicly noted that seventy percent of the deposit accounts at his institution contain $2,500 or less. (See Federal Reserve Bulletin, “Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2016 to 2019: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances,” Vol. 106, No. 5 (Sept. 2020) (noting that the conditional median value of transaction accounts in 2019 was $5,300 (the middle value in the data set after applying the criteria of having a transaction account), but that the mean value was about $42,000, suggesting that high-value accounts skew the mean); and Interview of James Reuter, CEO and President of FirstBank in Lakewood, CO, by Rob Blackwell (noting that 70% of FirstBank’s consumer accounts had a balance below $2,500 at one point in a one-year period).)

\textsuperscript{46} See Patricia Hagan Kuwayama, “Postal Banking in the United States and Japan: A Comparative Analysis,” Columbia University Monetary and Economic Studies (May 2000), pp. 76-91 (noting that “geographic availability of depository services provided to areas not served by private banks ... [did] not prov[e] to be [a] major source of demand for postal savings” and that during a period of times from the mid-1930s to the 1950s, the Postal Savings Program offered interest rates that exceeded the rates offered by many private institutions to try to attract consumers, although the program ultimately fell out of favor and declined).

address any shortfalls in credit markets. If the Fed was forced to take on a role as a supplier of credit to the public, it would represent a fundamentally new role for the Fed, with potentially significant ramifications, such as for the Fed to be subject to political pressure.

II. Responses to the Questions Posed in the RFC

With respect to Treasury’s questions relating to the implications of development and adoption of digital assets, and changes in financial market and payment infrastructures, for U.S. consumers, investors, and businesses and for equitable economic growth, The Clearing House provides the following comments:

➢ Question 1: What explains the level of current adoption of digital assets?

Digital assets, which typically support one or more specific use cases, such as by serving as a payment instrument, as a mechanism for the store of value, or as a transfer mechanism for example, have exploded in popularity over the past decade (see supra pp. 2-3). In large part, this is due to the absence of robust legal and regulatory frameworks for digital asset issuers and arrangements, which has allowed operators and products to proliferate without incurring typical compliance costs or supervisory oversight. As a result of this disparate regulatory environment, regulated U.S. businesses engaged in digital-asset-related activities (e.g., banks) often compete with firms that are governed by drastically different legal and regulatory frameworks, and with a significant degree of uncertainty. And in this environment, privately-issued digital assets that represent the obligations of unregulated or lightly regulated non-bank entities (e.g., many stablecoins), and private token-based cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum), have thrived. As a result, consumers, investors, and businesses that hold or use digital assets are exposed to a number of risks, and digital assets present illicit finance and national security risks. While addressing these risks may seem like a novel challenge, there is a long history in the U.S. of privately-issued money, and regulatory frameworks have proven themselves more than capable of addressing issues associated with private money. The Clearing House notes that while federal prudential regulators have focused on ensuring that U.S. banks can engage in digital-asset-

48 See supra pp. 3-5, and notes 15-21 & 24.
49 The growth and reach of cryptocurrency/stablecoins, the degree to which they permit anonymity, their usability, exchangeability for fiat currency, and other characteristics, all present AML/CFT risks that must be addressed as part of the development of a comprehensive federal prudential framework that applies standards to digital assets that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities. For example, nefarious actors might create solutions similar to Tornado Cash, and other programs, that are designed to evade whatever AML and CFT controls might exist on digital asset networks network, and have been used for these purposes. (See, e.g., “Tornado Cash Privacy Solution” (noting that Tornado Cash is a “non-custodial Ethereum and ERC20 privacy solution” that “improves transaction privacy by breaking the on-chain link between the recipient and destination addresses”; that that Tornado Cash “uses a smart contract that accepts ETH deposits that can be withdrawn by a different address”; and marketing itself by stating that “[w]henever ETH is withdrawn by the new address, there is no way to link the withdrawal to the deposit, ensuring complete privacy.” See also Elliptic Connect, “The $100 Million Horizon Hack: Following the Trail Through Tornado Cash to North Korea” (June 29, 2022, updated July 13, 2022); and “Janet Yellen Will Consider Limiting the Use of Cryptocurrency” and “Janet Yellen says ‘misuse’ of cryptocurrencies like bitcoin is a growing problem, as regulators increase scrutiny after surge in interest,” supra note 20.)
related activities safely and soundly,\textsuperscript{51} these actions have not addressed entities and activities outside of the regulatory perimeter, and have been subject, at times, to lack of coordination.\textsuperscript{52} Thus, The Clearing House believes that current levels of adoption of digital assets make it vital to bring those digital assets used for payments and the transfer and issuance functions associated with them within the regulatory perimeter on a national level through the development of a comprehensive federal prudential framework that applies standards that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities.

\textbf{Question 2: What factors would further facilitate mass adoption?}

Mass adoption of digital assets would be further facilitated by the development of a comprehensive federal prudential framework for U.S. businesses’ digital asset activities that applies standards that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities. Presently, the absence of such uniform federal rules means that U.S. businesses engaged in the same or similar digital asset activities can be regulated in very different ways, and that digital asset businesses often operate with a significant degree of uncertainty. For example, today, most stablecoin arrangements offered by nonbanks are not regulated or are only loosely regulated through an uneven patchwork of state money transmitter licensing laws, which are not fit for purpose.\textsuperscript{53} As a result, risks presented by these digital assets, including risks to consumers and businesses that hold digital assets, go unaddressed.\textsuperscript{54} A comprehensive, federal prudential framework applying common standards to digital asset issuance, transfer, and handling that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar digital-asset activities addresses these risks, would offer greater certainty for suppliers and users of digital-asset-based financial services, would engender confidence in digital-asset-based systems, and would help products, services, and platforms establish network effects.\textsuperscript{55} A comprehensive, federal prudential framework would also support mass adoption of digital assets/further growth of the digital assets sector by allowing U.S. businesses to compete on a level, and risk-balanced, playing field.

Additional digital asset adoption would be facilitated by the removal of obstacles faced by banks. These include requirements for approval/non-objection before engaging in/continuing to engage in digital-asset-related activities; and by addressing guidance that applies more stringent capital requirements to crypto-assets custodied by banks than other assets for which banks provide custody services. These changes would ensure that essential banking, payment, transfer, and issuance functions relating to crypto-assets can be performed within the highly regulated and supervised banking sector. For example, banks face significant supervisory headwinds from the OCC and other agency guidance that requires prior supervisory approval/non-objection before banks can engage in, or continue to engage in, digital-

\textsuperscript{51} See supra p. 5 and note 25.
\textsuperscript{52} See supra note 25.
\textsuperscript{53} State money transmitter licensing schemes, which largely pre-date the development of stablecoins, are often not fit for purpose, and may not even cover stablecoin arrangements at all. See supra note 22. .
\textsuperscript{54} See supra pp. 3-5, and notes 15-21 & 24.
asset related activities – something non-banks do not face. As a further example, recently-issued SEC guidance renders it virtually impossible for banks to engage in certain key crypto-asset-related activities. Addressing obstacles, such as these, that disadvantage banks from engaging in digital asset-related activities at a time when conducting these activities in the safe, sound banking perimeter would be most advantageous to the market and could protect consumers from many of the risks that are prevalent in the market today, is vital. Investors and customers will be worse off without the participation of regulated banking organizations in this market, as customers and the market would benefit from the entry of highly regulated banks with sophisticated risk management capabilities into the crypto-custody market. Consistent with the “whole of government” approach articulated in the Executive Order, the relevant agencies should evaluate the comprehensive legal, regulatory and supervisory frameworks applicable to banking organizations that addresses the risks identified by the SEC and determine that banks should be excluded from the accounting treatment in the recent SEC guidance, thereby enabling banks to provide custody services for crypto-assets.

Finally, digital asset adoption would benefit from ensuring that rules and guidance promulgated under a federal framework are consistent, clear and provide U.S. businesses engaged in digital asset activities with the certainty necessary to offer digital-asset-related products and services, and from supporting an architecture policy that prioritizes exchangeability between cryptocurrency/stablecoins and commercial bank money, the most widely-used settlement asset today.

Assuming these foundational regulatory issues can be addressed, the private sector stands ready to accelerate digital asset adoption and innovation, and there are several relevant examples of the private

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56 See OCC Interpretive Letter # 1179 and FDIC FIL-16-2022, supra note 25 (requiring prior notice and non-objection to regulators of ongoing or new digital-asset-related activities, even activities banks are expressly permitted to engage in).
57 See SEC, “Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121,” 87 Fed. Reg. 21,015 (Apr. 11, 2022) (providing that entities should record a liability and corresponding asset on their balance sheets for crypto-assets safeguarded for their platform users, with both the liability and asset measured at the fair value of the crypto-assets, which is a significant departure from the existing accounting treatment of safeguarded assets held in a custody account).
58 See Bank Policy Institute, “BPI, ABA and SIFMA Comment on Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121” (June 23, 2022) (link); and Letter to Senator Cynthia Lummis, from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Bank Policy Institute, “Re: SEC Staff Accounting Interpretation Regarding Crypto-Assets” (May 19, 2022) (link).
59 See “Joint Agency Statement on crypto-asset policy sprint” supra note 25 (recognizing the importance of providing timely, clear guidance on digital-asset-related topics).
60 See Speech by Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael J. Hsu, supra note 4, p. 6 (characterizing this concern as “interoperability across stablecoins,” and noting that “an enormous amount of economic activity take place efficiently because of the fungibility of modern-day commercial bank deposits).
61 Today, it can be expensive to transfer a digital asset from one wallet to another; and redeeming digital assets for U.S. dollars (presumably commercial bank money) can also be quite costly. (As of Jun. 6, 2022, transferring a stablecoin from one wallet to another wallet cost approximately $5 (see Etherscan.com); in comparison, the same transfer cost an estimated $22 on Nov. 5, 2021, and $54 on Nov. 22, 2021 (see Alexis Goldstein, “Written Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate,” p. 15 (Dec. 14, 2021)); and redeeming tether’s USDT (the most popular payments stablecoin by market capitalization) for fiat currency (withdrawal) costs the greater of $1,000 or 0.1% of the amount being redeemed (see Tether, “Fees” (Jun. 21, 2022)).
62 See supra note 32.
sector embracing digital assets already. As one example, the Regulated Liability Network ("RLN") proposal to tokenize commercial bank, potential central bank, and electronic money on the same chain offers the promise of delivering a next-generation digital money format based on national currency units (e.g., denominated in U.S. dollars). Tokens exchanged over the network ("RLN tokens") would be redeemable at par value on demand, and would provide an unambiguous legal claim on the regulated issuer; and the liabilities would be fungible between regulated institutions. The RLN would enable the instant movement of value 24x7x365, and would support "programmable money" insofar as payments can be automated, made conditional on events, and integrated into other digitized processes. As another example, Partior, a shared-ledger multi-currency clearing platform, was launched as a technology company in 2021. Partior is currently live with digital M1 (deposit liabilities of a commercial bank) being provided by JP Morgan (USD) and DBS (SGD) that can be transacted 24x7x365 and can utilize "smart contracts." Over time, the platform intends to cover a broad set of currencies and multiple providers for each currency.

➢ Question 3: What are the main opportunities for consumers, investors, and businesses from digital assets?

The additive value of digital assets (including privately-issued digital assets and private token-based cryptocurrency) to U.S. payments should be considered in light of the facts that U.S. payment systems are already diverse, well-functioning, provide consumers and businesses with an extraordinary degree of choice, and are constantly improving. For example, The Clearing House, which introduced its real-time payments system, the RTP network, several years ago, already has the technical connectivity to reach roughly 75% of the demand deposit accounts in the country. The RTP network gives the banking industry a modern platform for domestic payments, complete with rich data capabilities and immediate payment confirmation, and enables instantaneous settlement and availability, so funds that are transferred can be used or withdrawn as cash within seconds. Additionally, The Clearing House, through its IXB Initiative, has demonstrated the feasibility of linking the RTP network with other real-time payments systems around the world and is proceeding with an actual pilot that will enable real-time, cross-border payments that will settle in real-time or near-real-time.

The RTP network and IXB Initiative are not the only improvements occurring in U.S. payment systems. Examples abound. The Fed is building its real-time payment network, FedNow; banks are leading

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63 See Citi, “The Regulated Internet of Value” (link); and Tony McLaughlin, “The Regulated Internet of Value[,] Executive Summary” (link).
64 See Partior, “Platform” (link).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See The Clearing House, SWIFT, and EBA CLEARING, “EBA CLEARING, SWIFT, and The Clearing House join forces to speed up and enhance cross-border payments” (Oct. 11, 2021); and “EBA CLEARING, SWIFT, and The Clearing House to deliver pilot service for immediate cross-border payments” (Apr. 28, 2022).
innovation in domestic person-to-person, or P2P, payments with Early Warning Services’ Zelle service, which enables individuals to electronically transfer money from their bank account to another domestic registered user’s bank account, typically within minutes and without cost. Banks also continue to innovate on their own, and through partnerships, to meet the changing financial needs of households and individuals.

With respect to privately-issued digital assets and private token-based cryptocurrency, policymakers considering the development of a digital asset regulatory framework, or the development of policies designed to support mass adoption of digital assets/further growth of the digital assets sector, should consider (i) improvements already underway to U.S. payment systems; (ii) the substantial room for growth for certain of these improvements; and (iii) the significant promise of modifications to existing systems, including extending operating hours, adopting uniform standards, and implementing, globally, SWIFT GPI. Policymakers should also consider innovation in the marketplace today, such as the RLN (see supra pp. 12-13), which would enable the instant movement of value 24x7x365, either domestically or internationally, would support “programmable money,” insofar as payments can be automated, made conditional on events, and integrated into other digitized processes, and would deliver the benefits of tokenization without the downside of narrower proposals that might lead to a fragmented, regulated financial system. With respect to a CBDC, policymakers should carefully consider the serious risks to the banking system that a CBDC would pose, risks that cannot be justified in light of the fact that every policy goal articulated in support of a CBDC can be addressed through less risky, more efficient, and more economical alternatives that are either readily available in the market today, or are under development by the private sector (see Appendix A).

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71 See Zelle, “What’s Zelle®? Glad you asked!” (2022); Zelle, “How long does it take to receive money with Zelle®?” (2022); and Zelle, “Sending Money Safely with Zelle®” (2022) (noting that transactions are typically completed within minutes and generally do not incur transaction fees).


73 See supra notes 69-71.

74 As of 2021, there were more than 60 real-time payments systems, covering 65 countries/territories, in operation, and more under development. Linking these systems across the globe will allow cross-border payments to clear and settle in real-time or near real-time. (See “Real-time payment systems for the real world,” supra note 66.)

75 Extended hours of operation, such as 24x7x365 Fedwire operation, could help improve international bank-to-bank wire transfers; broad adoption of ISO 20022 standards — a global and open standard that creates a common language for payments worldwide — presents an opportunity to boost operational efficiency, enhance customer experience through more robust data standards and better data throughput, and enable innovative new services; and global implementation of SWIFT GPI also holds promise to improve the speed, efficiency, transparency and data integrity of cross-border payments. (See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Frequently Asked Questions,” at “Federal Reserve Actions to Support Instant Payments” (2022) (noting areas of Fed study and interest); SWIFT, “What is ISO 20022?”; and SWIFT, “SWIFT gpi[,] The new norm in cross-border payments.”)
➢ Question 4: Please identify and describe any risks arising from current market conditions in digital assets and any potential mitigating factors.

The absence of robust legal and regulatory frameworks for digital asset issuers and arrangements, which has allowed operators and products to proliferate, and exposed consumers, investors, and businesses that hold or use digital assets to a number of risks (addressed below in our response to Question 5), has materially contributed to the growth of the digital asset market in the U.S. and can only be addressed through the development of a comprehensive federal prudential framework applying standards to digital assets that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities. Although risks to users of digital assets are paramount, they are not the only risks that arise in the digital asset market/from digital asset implementations. Currently, digital assets present illicit finance and national security risks, pose systemic and global financial stability risks, and can present risks and challenges based on the specific design of digital assets/digital asset implementations.

Illicit finance and national security risks. Both cryptocurrency/stablecoins and CBDC pose illicit finance and AML/CFT risks. In the case of cryptocurrency and stablecoins, the growth and reach of cryptocurrency/stablecoins, the degree to which they permit anonymity, their usability, exchangeability for fiat currency, and other characteristics, all present AML/CFT risks that must be addressed as part of the development of a comprehensive federal prudential framework that applies standards to digital assets that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities. Additionally, gaps that exist between those AML/CFT regulations applicable to nonbank stablecoin arrangements and those applicable to banks’ payments-related activities and functionally similar stablecoin-related activity must be closed. TCH has urged FinCEN to address AML/CFT risks related to nonbank stablecoin arrangements, and to specifically address the gaps. Doing so would not only reduce illicit activity conducted using privately-issued digital assets but would also bring the U.S. more closely into alignment with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations and Guidance of a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service

76 The growth and reach of cryptocurrency/stablecoins, the degree to which they permit anonymity, their usability, exchangeability for fiat currency, and other characteristics, all present AML/CFT risks that must be addressed as part of the development of a comprehensive federal prudential framework that applies standards to digital assets that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities. See supra note 49.

77 For example, nefarious actors might create solutions similar to Tornado Cash, and other programs, that are designed to evade whatever AML and CFT controls might exist on digital asset networks network. See supra note 49.)

Providers, which the U.S. Treasury has supported. In general, TCH believes that rules addressing the AML/CFT risks of cryptocurrency and stablecoins must be aligned with rules applicable to banks’ payments-related activities and functionally similar stablecoin-related activity.

In the case of a U.S. CBDC, the digital nature of a CBDC – unlike cash, which is bounded by its physical characteristics and the requirement that it be transported in physical form – would raise heightened AML/CFT concerns and would be particularly dangerous in a CBDC designed to be used in cross-border or international trade and finance. Further, because the federal government has neither the infrastructure nor the manpower to conduct KYC, AML and CFT screening and other compliance today, it would need to either build and fund these capabilities alongside CBDC issuance or rely on the private sector to manage these risks. If the private sector is relied upon, then the experience of the private sector in managing these risks can be leveraged, but the significant reputational risk that comes with taking on these activities will be transferred to the private sector, as well as the costs of these activities (requiring an economic model that supports these activities). Moreover, to ensure AML/CFT compliance, either the government or the private sector will need to understand the nature and purposes of transactions and monitor for and provide reports on potential illicit activity, but this may be difficult given the “strong privacy protections” the Fed suggests will apply.

Systemic and global financial stability risks. Both cryptocurrency/stablecoins and CBDC pose systemic and global financial stability risks, but these risks are different. Although no single cryptocurrency or stablecoin arrangement has yet achieved the size and scale such that its disruption or failure would pose a financial stability risk, a global cryptocurrency or stablecoin with reach and adoption across multiple

80 See President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, “President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Releases Report on Recommendations on Stablecoins” Press Release (Nov. 1, 2021) (noting that the U.S. will continue “leading efforts” “to encourage countries to implement international AML/CFT standards and [to] pursue additional resources to support supervision of domestic AML/CFT regulations [in order to prevent misuse of stablecoins and other digital assets]”).
81 If CBDC is intended to be a substitute for cash, then it would likely need to be designed as an electronic bearer instrument. A bearer-instrument model, which does not require the central administration of accounts or wallets, could be designed using tokens and could preserve the privacy protections that users of cash have today by using technology applications and devices (e.g., phones) that enable the exchange of tokens without creating a record on a ledger, meaning off-line payments could be conducted between private parties. Importantly, electronic bearer instruments, especially those that have the stability of Fed backing raise additional AML/CFT concerns and complexity. Unlike physical bearer instruments, which are bounded by their physical nature – there is only so much money you can fit into a suitcase – digital bearer instruments have no such limitation and present heightened concerns.
82 “Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation,” supra note 26, pp. 13 & 19 (noting the importance of privacy protections and the importance of balancing the need to have strong privacy protections against other interests).
jurisdictions, and substantial volume, could pose such risks, and is feasible in a world in which global technology companies and social media platforms have worldwide footprints and billions of users. A cryptocurrency or stablecoin released by such a company has the potential for immense scale and significant, if not systemic, importance immediately upon release into the global marketplace. In order to address the systemic risks posed by such digital assets, TCH has expressed its agreement with the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure and Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“CPMI-IOSCO”) that full application of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures should be applied to systemically important stablecoin arrangements, and further urges the Financial Stability Oversight Council to consider ways it might use the authorities granted to it to address systemic risks of cryptocurrency or stablecoins.

In the case of a U.S. CBDC, there are significant risks of jeopardizing financial stability and the safety and soundness of domestic and global banking and financial systems. Domestically, the migration of bank deposits to CBDC, likely exacerbated in times of stress, will impact banks, the current safety net, and have a direct effect on the U.S. financial system as well as the cost and availability of credit for consumers and businesses. Abroad, a U.S. CBDC, backed as it would be by the Fed, could have significant destabilizing effects on foreign financial systems as populations in other parts of the world sought the relative safety and security of a U.S. central bank obligation. Foreign recipients of internationally transmitted U.S. CBDC would be the beneficiaries of 100% deposit protection from a foreign central bank – a benefit that they may not enjoy in their national banking system.

**Design-specific risks and challenges.** Technology used in connection with specific digital asset implementations can raise significant policy considerations and often requires decisionmakers to make tradeoffs. For example, distributed ledger technology (“DLT”), depending on how it is implemented, may offer a high level of resiliency and data integrity but can raise serious environmental concerns, putting...
certain DLT-based digital asset implementations in tension with U.S. environmental policy. DLT-based digital asset implementations may also not be as decentralized as one might think. According to recent research commissioned by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DLT, and blockchains specifically, are not immutable, are subject to interference and disruption, and present technological inefficiencies and concerns (e.g., the vast majority of nodes do not meaningfully contribute to the network). With respect to payments, DLT-based digital asset implementations may not enable transaction processing speeds customary for commercial and consumer payment systems. Throughput requirements, and other factors, such as trust parameters, appear to be the main reasons why the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has chosen to not focus on DLT as the operational platform for experimental CBDC administered by a central party. Another example of a technology decision that has policy tradeoff implications is whether to use open-source code to develop a digital asset. Proponents of using open-source code note the benefits of leveraging the large community of developers that look to improve the code and identify and fix bugs, ultimately leading to a more secure, resilient digital asset. Reliance on open-source code for important digital asset design or functions is not, however, without risks to the stability and integrity of the digital asset as the openness may provide opportunities to introduce viruses that cause programming changes or threaten the integrity of the

86 See University of Cambridge, Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index; and Total World Production & Consumption estimates (noting that the environmental impact of distributed ledger-based systems can be significant). See also Peter Stella, “Who Will Afford to Use Bitcoin?” (International Monetary Fund paper abstract) (2021) (comparing cost and efficiency of Bitcoin blockchain and six centralized fiat money payments systems — TARGET2, FEDWIRE/CHIPS, NACHA ACH, Hong Kong CHAPS, UK CHAPS, and Payments Canada, and concluding that although technological innovations may improve the relative efficiency of POW in cryptocurrencies and digital currencies, there are likely to remain significant differences based on asymmetrical incorporation of knowledge and party identity that will make cryptocurrencies and digital currencies less efficient).


88 See, e.g., Aaron Klein and George Selgin, “We shouldn’t have to wait for FedNow to have faster payments,” Brookings (Mar. 3, 2020) (highlighting the need for faster payments as a matter of public policy). Note: A payment over the RTP network, a real-time payment system in the US, is completed, with good funds available to the payee in a matter of seconds, whereas a payment using Bitcoin could take anywhere from 10 minutes to an hour or more depending on the number of end points that are required to confirm the transaction. (See Steve Buchko, “How Long do Bitcoin Transactions Take?” Coin Central (De. 12, 2017) (noting that the average time to mine a block is 10 minutes and that the Bitcoin community has set a standard of 6 confirmation, meaning that a transfer takes approximately 60 minutes before it can be considered complete); “Average time it take to mine a Bitcoin from January 2017 to April 13, 2021,” Statista (Apr. 14, 2021) (estimating the average time to mine a Bitcoin at around 10 minutes; meaning that a transaction would be completed in around an hour); and Alexandria/Decentralized Dog, “How Long Does a Bitcoin Transaction Take?” (Sept. 30, 2020) (noting that the average time for a Bitcoin-based payment is 10 minutes, but that transaction times can vary significantly).) 89 See Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Digital Currency Initiative, “Project Hamilton Phase 1[,] A High Performance Payment Processing System Designed for Central Bank Digital Currencies,” pp. 3-5 (Feb. 3, 2022) (noting baseline requirements of “time to finality of less than five seconds, throughput of greater than 100,000 transactions per second, and wide-scale geographic fault tolerance,” and model performance).

digital asset. Design choices such as these are of critical importance to central bank digital currencies, as well as to any widely used digital asset.\(^91\)

➢ **Question 5:** Please identify and describe potential risks to consumers, investors, and businesses that may arise through engagement with digital assets.

The rapid growth of the digital asset market has exposed consumers, investors, and businesses that hold or use digital assets to myriad risks (see supra pp. 3-5). These risks include the risk that an issuer or service provider will shut down, fail, or cut off customers’ access to their digital assets;\(^93\) risks associated with transparency and disclosure (e.g., issuers have been found to have made material misrepresentations about backing/reserve status);\(^94\) risks from developmental difficulties and design challenges;\(^95\) risks from internal and external manipulation and attack, including cyberattack;\(^96\) risks from custodial service provider failure;\(^97\) and run and contagion risks.\(^98\) Fundamentally, consumers, investors, and businesses must have a clear understanding of the benefits and risks of digital assets, as well as an understanding of how digital assets differ from traditional payment instruments and rails, so that they can make informed decisions. State money transmitter licensing schemes are insufficient to address these issues and risks.\(^99\) Instead, new laws, or revisions to existing laws, are necessary to ensure that appropriate consumer protections, and transaction risk allocation, are in place, with business


\(^{92}\) See E. Napoletano and Benjamin Curry, “Proof of Stake Explained,” Forbes Advisor (noting the benefits of a proof-of-stake design for digital assets).

\(^{93}\) See *supra* notes 15 & 16.

\(^{94}\) See *supra* note 19.

\(^{95}\) See *supra* note 18.

\(^{96}\) See *supra* note 17.

\(^{97}\) See *supra* notes 15 & 16. See also Coinbase Global, Inc., FORM 10-Q (for period ending Mar. 31, 2022), p. 83 (stating that that “in the event of bankruptcy, the crypto assets we hold in custody on behalf of our customers could be subject to bankruptcy proceedings”); and Nicholas Gordon, “Coinbase earnings were bad. Worse still, the crypto exchange is now warning that bankruptcy could wipe out user funds,” Fortune (May 11, 2022) (highlighting this statement and noting that if a crypto exchange holds crypto assets in custody, and goes bankrupt, then retail customers of the exchange could become general unsecured creditors).

\(^{98}\) See *supra* note 21.

\(^{99}\) While some states have addressed the inadequacy of state money transmitter licensing schemes as they relate to cryptocurrency and stablecoins by enacting specific regulations targeting digital currencies, the vast majority of states have yet to do so, leaving the potential for significant coverage gaps across the U.S. Even if state money transmitter laws apply to cryptocurrency and stablecoins, they are likely inadequate in numerous ways. For example, state money transmitter laws lack supervision at the holding company level, which is important given that the cryptocurrency/stablecoin arrangements that could scale the fastest would likely be associated with an already existing fintech platform. Additionally, (1) many state money transmitter laws and regulations promulgated under them do not impose third-party and vendor risk management requirements; (2) some state money transmitter laws fail to impose portfolio restrictions or restrictions on the use of customer funds and may not contain adequate capital or liquidity requirements, important factors given that the value of stablecoins must be backed by highly liquid assets in order to protect consumer investments; and (3) state money transmitter laws do not provide access to lender of last resort facilities. (See Letter from Robert C. Hunter, Deputy General Counsel and Director of Regulatory and Legislative Affairs, The Clearing House, to Chairman Sherrod Brown and Ranking Member Patrick J. Toomey, Senate Banking Committee (Feb. 11, 2022) (link) (providing a statement for the record on stablecoins and stablecoin arrangements, and discussing state money transmitter licensing schemes).)
models that enable potential losses to be absorbed. Ensuring that consumers, investors, and businesses are able to make informed decisions may also require that guardrails be put in place to enable consumers to identify when long-standing sources of protection, such as deposit insurance, exist/apply, and when they do not.\textsuperscript{100}

With further respect to risks presented by cryptocurrency/stablecoins, where privately-issued digital assets represent the obligations of unregulated or lightly regulated non-bank entities (e.g., many stablecoins), or private token-based cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum), the risks to consumers, investors, and businesses as outlined above and on pages 3-5 are significant. So too is the growing trend observed by federal regulators of consumers and digital asset users falling victim to scams involving cryptocurrency and theft (according to the FTC, consumers reported losing over $1 billion to fraud involving cryptocurrency from Jan. 2021 through Mar. 2022; according to Securities and Exchange Commission Chair Gary Gensler, more than $14 billion of value was stolen from digital asset customers in 2021; and according to Acting Comptroller of the OCC, Michael Hsu, crypto theft amounted to $3.2 billion in 2021).\textsuperscript{101} TCH firmly believes that the appropriate response to the risks to consumers, investors, and businesses presented by the growth of stablecoins and other nonbank cryptocurrencies is regulation, and supports the recommendations made in the PWG’s “Report on Stablecoins.”\textsuperscript{102} A comprehensive federal prudential framework should be adopted that applies standards to digital assets that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities. In adopting such a framework, policymakers should, among other things, require issuers of digital currencies (including stablecoins) to be licensed and subject to supervision, and should require any token marketed as “stable” to come with specific protections. For example, a “stable” token might: (1) be clearly tied to a single national currency; (2) constitute an obligation of the issuer to the holder; (3) provide appropriate consumer protections; and (4) be subject to clear rules around the issuer’s capital requirements and holding of collateral. Taking this approach to regulating new forms of private money (i.e., cryptocurrency and stablecoins), not only avoids relying on inadequate frameworks, such as state money transmitter licensing regimes, but is consistent with the history of private money in the U.S.\textsuperscript{103}

In comparison to cryptocurrency and stablecoins, the risks to consumers, investors, and businesses from a CBDC generally flow from the impact that the introduction of a CBDC would have on existing financial systems. These risks include, but are not limited to: (1) a decline in credit availability (and increase in

\textsuperscript{100} See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “False Advertising, Misrepresentations of Insured Status, and Misuse of the FDIC’s Name or Logo,” 87 Fed. Reg. 33,415 (June 2, 2022) (elaborating on what constitutes false advertising of the protections of federal deposit insurance); \textit{and CFPB, “CFPB Takes Action to Protect Depositors from False Claims About FDIC Insurance” (May 17, 2022) (noting that misuse of the name or logo of the FDIC, and deceptive representations about deposit insurance, have taken on “renewed importance” in light of crypto-assets, stablecoins, and other emerging financial technologies). \textit{See also} Davis Polk, “A shot across the fintech bow – The FDIC’s reported investigation of Voyager Digital” (July 19, 2022); \textit{and Allyson Versprille, “FDIC Probing How Bankrupt Crypto Broker Voyager Marketed Itself,”} Bloomberg (July 7, 2022)


\textsuperscript{102} “Report on STABLECOINS,” \textit{supra} note 7, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{103} See “Taming Wildcat Stablecoins,” \textit{supra} note 31.
cost) for consumers and businesses that flows from a reduction in bank deposits; (2) exacerbation of runs on financial firms; (3) complication of monetary policy; (4) privacy concerns; (5) potential destabilization of foreign financial systems where individuals and businesses may prefer the relative safety and security of a U.S. central bank obligation to an obligation of their home central banks; (6) potentially exposing of the Fed to increased political pressures over time; and (7) increased cyber and operational risk.\(^\text{104}\)

➢ **Question 6:** Can digital assets play a role in increasing unbanked households’ and other underserved Americans’ access to safe, affordable, and reliable financial services, and if so, how?

Advocates for digital assets to serve as a vehicle for financial inclusion often ignore the reasons households and individuals in the U.S. are unbanked or use nonbank financial services in the first place. These reasons, which are varied (e.g., lack of trust, privacy concerns, lack of broadband access, lack of documentation to fulfill KYC requirements, etc.) and complex, are not generally related to the absence of low-/no-cost digital payment tools or bank accounts.\(^\text{105}\) For example, a segment of domestic unbanked consumers rely on cash and do not possess the tools (smartphones and devices capable of connecting to the internet) that are necessary to hold and use digital assets.\(^\text{106}\) As a further example, another segment of the unbanked do not trust banks and would not likely trust a digital asset issued by a private entity, or CBDC issued by the government.\(^\text{107}\) While the absence of a central, issuing party – a characteristic of some cryptocurrencies (e.g., bitcoin) – may be attractive to individuals who do not trust private entities or the government, the anonymity, easy transferability, and digital bearer instrument nature of these cryptocurrencies raise extraordinary AML and CFT concerns, offsetting any potential benefits from financial inclusion. Further, holding and using an issuer-less cryptocurrency provides a limited benefit, as it does not come with the attendant benefits of the banking system, such as wealth building, establishing credit, access to mortgage and other loans, and financial counseling.

Consequently, digital assets very likely cannot make a meaningful difference in further reducing the unbanked rate in the U.S., as a segment of the unbanked cannot use them, and there is no obvious reason why consumers who do not trust banks, or who are concerned with the privacy implications of sharing information with anyone else, would trust private issuers of cryptocurrency or stablecoins or the federal government as an issuer of CBDC, or be willing to accept privacy-related incongruities between cash and digital currencies (i.e., the digital trail behind any digital asset). Financial inclusion in the U.S. benefits from the robust programs that regulated financial institutions have, and are already required to have, in place.\(^\text{108}\) Additional gains in financial inclusion could come from: (1) application of requirements similar to those of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to nonbank financial institutions, or statutory changes to apply the CRA to nonbank financial institutions; (2) public-private partnerships that highlight low- and no-cost accounts offered by banks, such as the Bank On program; (3) bank and alternative financial service provider innovations that meet the needs of unbanked individuals and households; (4) upgrades to legacy systems that, if made by the government, could facilitate the rapid distribution of

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\(^{104}\) See Letter from Robert C. Hunter, supra note 29, pp. 3-10.

\(^{105}\) “Delivering Financial Products and Services to the Unbanked and Underbanked in the United States – Challenges and Opportunities,” supra note 72, pp. 8-16.

\(^{106}\) *Id.* at p. 13.

\(^{107}\) *Id.* at pp. 12.

\(^{108}\) *Id.* at pp. 26-29.
benefit payments through same-day ACH or existing real time payments systems, as well as the soon-to-be-available FedNow; (5) actions by the government to study and reduce barriers to individuals entering the banking system (including digital identification); and (6) expanded broadband internet access in underserved areas.109

III. Conclusion

Privately-issued digital assets, and private token-based cryptocurrency, have grown tremendously over the past decade. Today, these digital assets have neared, or possibly even surpassed, $2 trillion in market capitalization.110 Given the rapid growth of these assets, and the significant challenges and risks they represent, the work Treasury is doing to solicit stakeholder input on the implications of development and adoption of digital assets, and changes in financial market and payment infrastructures, for U.S. consumers, investors, and businesses and for equitable economic growth is critical. The Clearing House believes that for U.S. firms, including banks, to realize the full potential of digital assets (1) a comprehensive federal prudential framework applying standards to digital asset service providers that are equivalent to those that apply to depository financial institutions when engaged in functionally similar activities is essential; (2) banks should be no less able to engage in digital-asset-related activities than nonbanks; and (3) federal regulatory clarity is imperative, particularly where digital assets will serve as a means of payment or will be held in custody by financial institutions.

With respect to a potential U.S. CBDC, The Clearing House believes that the risks associated with the possible issuance of a CBDC in the U.S. outweigh its potential benefits, particularly in light of the ability of existing alternatives to achieve the policy goals that have been advanced in support of CBDC.

We thank you for your consideration and review of these comments. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this letter, please do not hesitate to contact me using the contact information provided below.

Yours very truly,

/S/

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109 Id. at pp. 39-41.
110 See Speech by Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael J. Hsu, supra note 4.
## Appendix A

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<th>Purpose</th>
<th>CBDC</th>
<th>Alternative Solutions</th>
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| Financial Inclusion / Distribution of Government Benefits | **Pros:**
- Government support
**Cons:**
- Poorly suited for the unbanked
- May crowd out or compete with other systems and innovations
- Potential to disrupt banking and payments ecosystems | - No- and low-cost bank accounts
- Bank On-certified accounts
- Prepaid cards
- Alternative financial products and services (fintech services)
- Instant bank-centric payment systems with immediate funds availability (e.g., RTP network and FedNow)
- Regulated Liability Network |

| To Defend Against Unregulated Private Currencies | **Pros:**
- Provides government with additional tool in public-private currency competition **Cons:**
- May crowd out or compete with other systems and innovations
- Potential to disrupt banking and payments ecosystems | - Regulate private currencies to the extent not captured under current regulatory schemes
- Regulated Liability Network |

| To Improve Cross-Border Payments | **Pros:**
- Could reduce the number of entities involved in a cross-border payment
- Could reduce the number of networks involved in a cross-border payment **Cons:**
- Not likely to be any more effective in improving cross-border payments than private sector efforts
- May increase AML/BSA risk and sanction evasion
- May crowd out or compete with other systems and innovations
- Potential to disrupt banking and payments ecosystems
- Potential to disrupt foreign banking markets | - Improvements in International bank-to-bank wire transfers through extended hours of operations, adoption of ISO 20022 standards, SWIFT GPI and other market improvement initiatives
- Potential to extend reach of domestic instant payments systems to support cross border payments
- Improved transparency in remittance transfers
- Government efforts to remove frictions that only the government can address (e.g., disparate regulatory and consumer protection frameworks across jurisdictions)
- Regulated Liability Network |
| To Facilitate Monetary Policy | Pros:  
|                             | - Unlocks new tools |
| Cons:  
| | - Forces central bank to take a more active role in lending and to assume risks in times of crisis |
| | - Politicization of the central bank (requires mass adoption) |
| | Traditional tools of the Federal Reserve, including interest on reserves, discount rate, buying and selling government securities |
| Preservation of U.S. dollar as a Reserve Currency | Pros:  
| | - U.S. would have a CBDC to defend against the introduction of CBDC by other governments |
| Cons:  
| | - Potential to destabilize both domestic and foreign financial system |
| | Ensure that the factors that have made U.S. dollar a reserve currency continue – stable government, rule of law, etc. are maintained |